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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 900217-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of theft by deception, 
a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990), 
and receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly prohibited defendant from impeaching a prosecution 
witness with a prior conviction. 
M[T]rial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence 
are not to be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Timothy Kevin Duncan, was charged with 
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), and theft by deception, a class B 
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990) (R. 6-7). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as 
charged (R. 67-68). The trial court sentenced defendant to the 
Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
for the felony conviction and six months for the misdemeanor 
conviction, those terms to run consecutively to sentences 
defendant was then serving (R. 77). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issue raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out above in the Statement of the 
Case and below in the argument portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
prohibiting defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with 
a prior conviction that was not admissible under rule 509, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROHIBITING 
DEFENDANT FROM IMPEACHING A PROSECUTION 
WITNESS WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION THAT WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Prior to trial, defendant sought a ruling from the 
trial court allowing him to impeach the prosecution's chief 
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witness with a prior conviction under rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules 
of Evidence (T. 75-80). The court denied the motion, concluding 
that the conviction was not one which could be used to impeach 
the witness under rule 609(a) because it was a misdemeanor 
conviction not punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year 
and did not involve a crime of dishonesty or false statement (T. 
81). It stated: 
The Court concludes that the order of May 
2nd, 1986, signed by Judge Sawaya is the 
actual conviction. And that on its face 
indicates that the crime is Attempted 
Unlawful Distribution for Value of a 
Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Accordingly, under 609(a), the Court 
concludes that it is not a conviction 
involving imprisonment for over one year. 
So, for that reason, I will not allow you to 
use that for impeachment purposes. 
(T. 81). 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred 
in not allowing impeachment based on the prior conviction. He 
claims that the witness's conviction of attempted unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance, which was based 
on a guilty plea and entered as a conviction of a class A 
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990), 
should have been treated as a felony conviction for purposes of 
rule 609(a). 
According to the representations of defense counsel in 
the trial court, the prosecution's chief witness, Mike Skillings, 
had been charged with unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. He pleaded guilty 
to the lesser charge of attempted unlawful distribution of a 
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controlled substance, a third degree felony, and the trial court 
entered a conviction for that offense as a class A misdemeanor 
pursuant to section 76-3-402(1) (T. 76-77). 
Rule 609(a) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the* 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
The rule focuses on a prior conviction and refers specifically to 
the "law under which [the witness] was convicted." Thus, the 
specific question presented here is whether the trial court 
correctly concluded that Skillings's prior conviction was a 
misdemeanor conviction not punishable by imprisonment in excess 
of one year and therefore inadmissible under rule 609(a)(1). 
There appears to be no dispute that Skillings's prior 
conviction of attempted unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance resulted from his entry of a guilty plea to 
a charge of that third degree offense. However, contrary to 
defendant's view, Skillings's guilty plea did not in itself 
constitute a conviction; it was nothing more than "an 
Neither the order signed by Judge Sawaya with respect to 
Skillings's prior conviction nor any documentation of the plea 
entered by Skillings appears in the record before this Court. 
However, because the prosecutor did not disagree with defense 
counsel's representations regarding those matters in the trial 
court (T. 75-81), the State will assume that what defense counsel 
represented was accurate. 
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acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the offense 
charged." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(1) (1990). The relevant 
reference point for rule 609(a) is not the guilty plea but rather 
the judgment of conviction that was entered. 
Section 76-3-402(1) provides: 
If the court, having regard for the nature 
and circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant, concludes 
that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of 
offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the 
court may, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law, enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower category of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Although Skillings pleaded guilty to a third degree felony 
charge, his conviction, entered as a "judgment of conviction" by 
the court under section 76-3-402(1), was for a class A 
misdemeanor. That statute does not merely allow the court to 
sentence a defendant to a sentence associated with a lower 
category offense, it allows the court to "enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower category offense." In fact, in 
Skillings's case, the court entered a judgment of conviction for 
a class A misdemeanor. Therefore, under the plain language of 
section 76-3-402(1) and the court's judgment, Skillings's prior 
conviction was for a category of offense that was not punishable 
by imprisonment in excess of one year. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-204(1) (1990) (class A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding one year). 
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That the judgment of conviction is the relevant 
reference point rather than the guilty plea is supported by State 
v. Theison# 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). There, in 
declining to address the defendant's challenge to the district 
court's denial of his petition for expungement of his arrest and 
conviction because there was an inadequate record on appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
Our examination of the record fails to 
disclose any conviction of defendant to be 
expunged. The minute entry of his May 9, 
1980 arraignment indicates that upon 
defendant's guilty plea to "THEFT 2nd 
Degree," the matter was merely continued for 
sentence and defendant referred to the 
probation department for a presentence 
report. The subsequent minute entry of May 
23, 1980, provides only that at the time set 
for the sentence on the felony charge the 
trial court placed defendant on probation 
under the supervision of the probation 
department. There is nothing in the record 
before this Court to show any acceptance of 
the guilty plea, findings, conviction, 
judgment, or imposition of sentence by the 
lower court upon defendant. 
Without any indication in the record of 
the proceedings below concerning the 
disposition of the second degree felony 
charge against defendant, we cannot determine 
in what manner the court acted. It is 
possible that the court intended to enter 
defendant's conviction, impose sentence which 
was stayed, and place defendant on probation. 
But the record does not so indicate. 
709 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). It is 
obvious from the foregoing that the supreme court did not 
consider the entry of a guilty plea to be a conviction; after 
entry of the plea, there is no conviction until the court has 
accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction. See also 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). Theison makes equally clear that section 
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76-3-402 is not merely a sentencing statute, for it "allows a 
court the discretion in appropriate cases to enter a conviction 
for the 'next lower category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly.'" ^d. at 308 n.l (emphasis added). 
State v. Delashmuttf 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 1983) (per 
curiam), cited by defendant in support of his contention that a 
guilty plea standing alone constitutes a conviction, is not 
inconsistent with this view. In that case the supreme court 
obviously assumed that the defendant's prior guilty plea had been 
accepted by the trial court and a judgment of conviction had been 
entered on the plea at the time sentence was imposed. j[d. at 
384. And, insofar as United States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406 (10th 
Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 848 (1975), which construed 
Oklahoma law, may suggest a different conclusion, it is 
inconsistent with Theison and the plain language of section 76-3-
402(1) and rule 609(a). Furthermore, Turner by no means 
expresses the only view on the subject. As noted in United 
States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 
U.S. 1073 (1978) (holding that a verdict of guilty where judgment 
and sentence have not been entered is admissible for impeachment 
purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609): 
By this holding we intimate no view as to 
the admissibility for impeachment purposes of 
pleas of guilty standing alone without a 
judgment of conviction and imposition of 
sentence. At least one circuit has held that 
"a guilty plea is a confession of guilt and 
amounts to a conviction" for impeachment 
purposes, United States v. Turner, supra, 497 
F.2d at 407, while other circuits have held 
otherwise. United States v. Lee, 166 
U.S.App.D.C. 67, 509 F.2d 40[0] (1974); 
United States v. Semenson, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d 
Cir. 1970). 
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560 F.2d at 1241. Indeed, generally when courts refer to guilty 
pleas for purposes of impeachment under rule 609(a), they talk 
about guilty pleas that have resulted in conviction. For 
example, as the court stated in United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 
535 (D.C. Cir. 1980): 
A guilty plea which results in conviction 
is of course fully equivalent for impeachment 
purposes to a determination of guilt 
following trial. A guilty plea is thus fully 
admissible for impeachment purposes, assuming 
the prerequisites of Rule 609 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence are satisfied. 
636 F.2d at 545-46 n.32 (citation omitted; emphasis added). See 
also Trindle v. Sonat Marine Inc., 697 F. Supp. 879, 881 n.4 
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Tussell v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F. Supp. 
979, 981 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1983). Cf. State v. Cash, 40 Ohio St.3d 
116, 532 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1988) (guilty plea constituted prior 
conviction which could be used for impeachment, even though 
pronouncement of sentence still pending). 
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that Shillings's 
prior misdemeanor conviction was not admissible to impeach him 
under rule 609(a). See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 
1989) ("convictions for crimes not involving dishonesty or false 
statement cannot be used for impeachment purposes in Utah unless 
they are felony convictions and the trial court has applied the 
proper balancing test under . . . rule [609]"); State v. Brown, 
In addition to ruling that the prior conviction was not 
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, the court ruled 
that it was not a conviction of a crime which involved dishonesty 
or false statement (see rule 609(a)(2)) (T. 81). Defendant does 
not argue that the prior conviction, even if for a misdemeanor, 
was nevertheless admissible under rule 609(a)(2). 
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771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (under rule 609(a), 
trial court improperly ruled that the defendant's prior 
misdemeanor convictions of theft were admissible for impeachment 
without first determining whether they involved dishonesty or 
false statement); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. 
App.) ("Under subsection (a)(1) of Rule 609, the DUI conviction 
was not admissible because not punishable by more than one year's 
imprisonment."), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). See also 
United States v. Nichols, 808 F.2d 660, 664 (8th Cir.) (trial 
court properly refused to allow the defendant to question FBI 
agent, the government's principal witness, about a traffic 
conviction for DUI; because conviction did not permit 
imprisonment greater than one year and crime did not involve 
dishonesty or false statement, it was not admissible under rule 
609(a), Federal Rules of Evidence), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1038 
(1987); United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 
1983) (district court did not err in excluding evidence of 
government witness's prior arson conviction where witness had 
withdrawn original guilty plea to felony and had pleaded guilty 
3 
to lesser included misdemeanor offense). The court's ruling 
serves both the purpose of section 76-3-402(1) (i.e., entry of a 
conviction for a higher category offense should not be made when, 
"having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
The appellate courts of this state look to the interpretation 
of the federal rules of evidence by the federal courts to aid in 
interpreting Utah's rules of evidence. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986). 
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character of the defendant," such would be "unduly harsh") and of 
rule 609(a) (i.e., limiting the admissibility of prior 
convictions for impeachment). 
Because defendant fails in his challenge to the trial 
court's determination that Skillings's prior conviction was a 
misdemeanor conviction which could not be used for impeachment 
under rule 609(a), his additional point regarding the need to 
perform the weighing function required in certain circumstances 
under rule 609(a)(1) need not be addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /&?£*>day of October, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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